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Abstract
In a previous note [1], we observed a safety violation in Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8] and a liveness violation in
FaB [12, 13]. In this manuscript, we sketch fixes to both. The same view-change core is applied in the
two schemes, and additionally, applied to combine them and create a single, enhanced scheme that has
the benefits of both approaches.
1 Introduction
The crux of a view-change protocol is a mechanism that guarantees that a decision in a new view does not
conflict with a decision that can ever be committed in any lower view. In [1], we exposed safety issues with
the view-change mechanism of Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8], and liveness issues with that of FaB [12, 13].
In this manuscript, we sketch fixes for both. The principles we provide concentrate around a core view-
change scheme that is applied in the two schemes.
The difficulty in protocols like FaB and Zyzzyva is that they combine a fast-track decision with a recovery-
track. Therefore, a possible decision is tranfered across views in two ways, corresponding to the two tracks,
and combining them requires care. Simply put, in our approach a replica accepts a leader proposal in a new
view as safe only if it is compatible with a potential decision from the highest view-number of any lower
view.
We first sketch in §2 a solution modeled after FaB, that we name Thelma, for a single-shot consensus.
Borrowing from FaB, Thelma provides an optimistically fast BFT solution in a fault model parameterized
by n = 3f + 2t + 1 with the following guarantees. It is fast during periods of synchrony, and in face of up
to t non-leader failures. It is always safe against f Byzantine failures.
We proceed in §3 with a solution modeled after Zyzzyva, that we name Velma, for state-machine-
replication. Borrowing from Zyzzyva, Velma provides an optimistically fast execution track in a fault model
of n = 3f + 1 with the following guarantees. It reaches a commit decision on client requests in three-hops
during periods of synchrony and of no failures. It is always safe against up to f Byzantine failures.
Both Thelma and Velma require replicas to maintain information from a constant-bounded number of
previous views, and to send constant-bounded information in new-view messages. This improved on two
previous solution frameworks that have optimistically tracks: Refined-Quorum-Systems [6], a fast single-
shot Byzantine consensus, and Azyzzyva [2], a fast State-Machine-Replication. In both of these previous
works, replicas maintain/send information from all past views.
Finally, we combine in §4 the benefits of the parameterized fault model n = 3f + 2t+ 1 with full state-
replication in a solution, that we name Zelma. In Zelma, a decision on a client request is committed in the
fast track during periods of synchorny, when up to t non-leader replicas are faulty. Zelma provides safety at
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all times against up to f Byzantine failures. It guarantess liveness during periods of synchrony with up to
f failures.
In all three protocols, we shed light on correctness via a proof sketch. Formal algorithm descriptions and
correctness proofs are deferred to a future manuscript.
1.1 Preliminaries
The focus of this work is providing state-machine-replication (SMR) for n replicas, f of which can be
Byzantine faulty. An unbounded set of clients may form requests and submit them to replicas. We refer
to members of the system, replicas or clients, as nodes. The communication among nodes is authenticated,
reliable, but asynchronous; that is, we assume that a message sent from a correct node to another correct
node is signed and eventually arrives.
At the core of SMR is a protocol for deciding on a growing log of operation requests by clients, satisfying
the following properties:
Agreement If two correct replicas commit decisions at log position s, then the decisions are the same.
Validity If a correct replica commits a decision at some log position, then it was requested (and signed) by
some client.
Liveness If some correct client submits a request, and the system is eventually partially-synchronous [5],
then eventually the replicas commit some decision.
In the case of Thelma (as in FaB), we concentrate only on the core consensus problem for a single decision.
View Change
The solutions we discuss employ a classical framework that revolves around an explicit ranking among
proposals via view numbers.
Replicas all start with an initial view, and progress from one view to the next. They accept requests and
respond to messages only in their current view.
In each view there is a single designated leader. In a view, zero or more decisions may be reached. This
strategy separates safety from liveness: It maintains safety even if the system exhibits arbitrary communi-
cation delays and again up to f Byzantine failures; it provides progress during periods of synchrony.
If a sufficient number of replicas suspect that the leader is faulty, then a view change occurs and a new
leader is elected. The mechanism to trigger moving to a higher view is of no significance for safety, but
it is crucial for liveness. On the one hand, replicas must not be stuck in a view without progress; on the
other hand, they must not move to a higher view capriciously, preventing any view from making progress.
Hence, a replica moves to a higher view if either a local timer expires, or if it receives new view suggestions
from f + 1 replicas. Liveness relies on having a constant fraction of the views with a correct leader, whose
communication with correct replicas is timely, thus preventing f + 1 replicas from expiring.
Dealing with leader replacement is the pinnacle of both safety and liveness. A core aspect in forming
agreement against failures is the need for new leaders to safely adopt previous leader values. The reason is
simple, it could be that a previous leader has committed a decision, so the only safe thing to do is adopt his
value.
In the prevailing solutions for the benign settings (DLS [5], Paxos [10], VR [14], Raft [15]), leader
replacement is done by reading from a view-change quorum of n− f replicas, and choosing the value with
the maximal view 1 number. Note that n − f captures a requirement that the quorum intersects every
leader-quorum in previous views (not only the most recent one). It is crucial to take into consideration how
leader quorums of multiple previous views interplay. Choosing the value with the maximal view-number is
crucial because there may be multiple conflicting values and choosing an arbitrarily value is not always a
safe decision.
1In DLS, the term phase is used, and in Paxos, ballot.
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A similar paradigm holds in PBFT [3, 4]. The new leader needs to read from a view-change quorum of
n − f replicas and choose a value with the maximal view-number. Different from the benign case, in the
Byzantine settings, uniqueness is achieved by using enlarged, Byzantine quorums [11]. Byzantine quorums
guarantee intersection not just in any node but in a correct node.
In Byzantine settings, a correct node also needs to prove a decision value to a new leader. This is done in
PBFT2 by adding another phase before a decision. The first phase ensure uniqueness via prepare messages
from n−f nodes. In the second phase, nodes send a commit-certificate consisting of n−f prepare messages.
A decision can be reached when a commit-quorum of n− f nodes have sent a commit-certificate.
The two-phase scheme guarantees the follows. If there is a decision, there exists a correct node in the
intersection between a commit-quorum and a view-change quorum that passes a commit-certificate to the
next view.
Indeed, a new leader chooses in PBFT a value whose commit-certificate, rather than a prepare, has the
maximal view-number.
2We refer here to the PBFT version with signed messages [3].
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2 Thelma: Revisiting the FaB View-Change
2.1 A Skeletal Overview of PFaB
Martin and Alvisi introduce Fast Byzantine Consensus (FaB) in [12, 13], a family of protocols parameterized
by various resilience assumptions. The papers use the Paxos terminology to model roles: proposers, acceptors,
and learners. And it employs proposal numbers to enumerate proposals. We will adhere to the Zyzzyva (and
PBFT) terminology, and translate those to leaders, replicas, and view-numbers.
FaB has two variants. The first FaB variant works with n = 5f + 1 replicas, trading fast termination by
with reduced resilience. Here, we focus on the second variant, parameterized with n = 3f + 2t + 1, where
t ≤ f . We refer to it here as PFaB. It works in two tracks, a fast track and a recovery track.
The fast track protocol of PFaB is an easy two-step protocol. A leader pre-proposes a value to replicas,
who each accept one value per view and respond with a prepare message. A decision is reached in PFaB
when a fast-quorum of n− t replicas accept the leader’s proposal and send a prepare response for it.
The fast track is guaranteed to complete in periods of synchrony with a correct leader and up to t
Byzantine replicas. However, parameterized FaB does not necessarily guarantee fast progress even in periods
of synchrony, if the parameter t threshold of failures is exceeded. That is, although PFaB is always safe
despite up to f Byzantine failures, it is not always fast.
If progress is stalled, PFaB allows progress via a recovery protocol, which is essentially PBFT (adapted
to n = 3f +2t+1). The recovery track is guaranteed to complete during periods of synchrony if the number
of actual Byzantine failures does not exceed f .
More precisely, in PFaB, the recovery track revolves around forming a commit-certificate called a commit-
proof. When replicas accept a leader proposal, in addition to sending prepare messages (ACCEPTED) to the
leader, replicas also send signed prepare messages to each other. We say that a replica has a commit-
certificate for a value v if it receives in a view prepare messages for v from a recovery-quorum of (n− f − t)
replicas. Upon obtaining a commit-certificate, a replica sends it in a commit message (COMMITPROOF) to
other replicas.
A decision is reached if either a fast-quorum of n− t replicas send prepare messages (for the same value),
or a recovery-quorum of (n− f − t) replicas send commit messages (for the same value).
The core mechanism in PFaB for transferring safe values across views is a progress certificate containing
new-view messages (REP) from a progress-quorum of n − f replicas. A new-view message from a replica
contains the new view’s number, the last value it sent in a prepare message, and the last commit-certificate
it sent in a commit message.
In PFaB, a progress-certificate for a specific new view is said to vouch for a value v if there does not exist
a set of f + t+ 1 new-view messages with an identical prepare value v′ such that v′ 6= v; and there does not
exist any commit-certificate with value v′ such that v′ 6= v.
2.2 Thelma
We now outline a new view-change scheme within the above PFaB protocol framework. We will refer to the
fixed protocol as Thelma.
In order to fix PFaB, each replica needs to maintain with the last prepare and commit messages it sent
their original view numbers. When a replica copies its last prepare and commit messages into a new-view
message, it needs to attach the original view numbers to them.
A decision is transferred across views via a progress-certificate as follows.
• A possible fast-track decision is transferred across views via a set of prepares intersecting a progress-
quorum. Complicating matters, each prepare may be repeated in higher views, hence different prepares
in the intersection may carry different view-numbers.
• A possible recovery track decision is transferred across views via a commit-certificate.
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To combine possible decision values from both tracks, replicas need to choose the highest previous view
in which a decision is possible. If both tracks appear possible for the same view-number, then a commit-
certificate provides evidence against a potential fast-track decision in the same view.
More specifically, let P be a progress-certificate consisting of view-change messages from a progress-
quorum of n− f replicas.
In order to simplify processing P , we introduce several key notions.
fast-certificate(d): The highest view-number v such that f + t+1 prepare messages in P contain the value
d and a view-number at least v. If no such v exists, we set fast-certificate(d) to −1.
PFAST(d): If fast-certificate(d) has the highest view-number among fast-certificates in P , then PFAST(d)
is true; otherwise, it is false.
PSLOW(d): If a commit-certificate for d exists in P and has the highest view-number among commit-
certificates, then PSLOW(d) is true; otherwise, it is false.
We are now ready to determine when a value d is safe for a progress-certificate P :
1. PSLOW(d) holds, and for all d′, fast-certificate(d′) has view-number no higher than the commit-
certificate for d, or
2. PFAST(d) holds, and for all d′, a commit-certificate for d′ if exists has view-number lower than fast-
certificate(d), or
3. for no value d′ does PSLOW(d′) or PFAST(d′) hold; hence, all values are safe.
2.3 Examples
To demonstrate Thelma’s view-change, we revisit the “stuck” scenario in [1], as well as another scenario.
For these scenarios, we set f = 1, t = 0, n = 3f + 2t+ 1 = 4. Denote the replicas by i1, i2, i3, i4, one of
whom, say i1, is Byzantine.
The first scenario goes through one view change.
View 1:
1. Leader i1 (Byzantine) pre-proposes value d to i2, i3.
2. i1, i2, i3 send prepare messages for d.
3. i2 collects a view-1 commit-certificate for d and sends a commit message for d.
4. Meanwhile, the leader i1 equivocates and pre-proposes d
′ to i4.
View 2:
1. The new leader i2 collects a progress-certificate consisting of new-view messages from a quorum of 3
replicas (including itself):
• from i1, the new-view message contains a prepare for d
′ from view 1, and no commit-certificate.
• from i2, the new-view message contains a prepare for d from view 1, and a view-1 commit-
certificate for it.
• from i4, the new-view message contains a prepare for d
′, and no commit-certificate.
In this progress-certificate, PSLOW(d) holds, and no fast-certificate has a view-number higher than d’s
commit-certificate view-number (1). Therefore, it determines d as the only safe value to propose.
Indeed, notice that a decision on d is still possible in view 1: i3 may send a commit message, and i1
(Byzantine) may send a commit message even though it already moved to view 2.
The second scenario goes through two view changes.
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View 1:
1. Leader i1 (Byzantine) pre-proposes value d to i2, i3.
2. i1, i2, i3 send prepare messages for d.
3. i1 collects a commit-certificate for d (and stalls).
4. Meanwhile, the leader i1 equivocates and pre-proposes d
′ to i4.
View 2:
1. The new leader i2 collects a progress-certificate consisting of new-view messages from a quorum of 3
replicas (including itself):
• from i1, a new-view message contains the prepare for d
′ from view 1, and no commit-certificate.
• from i2, a new-view message contains the prepare for d from view 1, and no commit-certificate.
• from i4, a new-view message contains the prepare for d
′, and no commit-certificate.
2. d′ is a safe value for the progress-certificate since PFAST(d′) it true, and there are no commit-
certificates. i2 uses the progress-certificate to pre-propose d
′ to replicas as a safe value.
3. everyone sends prepare messages for d′, and a client learns that d′ is committed.
View 3:
1. The new leader i3 collects a progress-certificate consisting of new-view messages from a quorum of 3
replicas:
• from i1, the new-view message hides the fact that it prepared a value in view 2, and contains a
prepare for d from view 1, and a view-1 commit-certificate for it.
• from i3 and i4, the new-view message contains a prepare for d
′ from view 2
In this progress-certificate, PFAST(d′) holds, and the highest commit-certificate has view-number 1 (for
d). Therefore, it determines B as the only safe value to propose.
Note that this scenario demonstrates that a commit-certificate may not necessarily override a set of f +1
prepares, unless its view-number is at least that of the highest fast-certificate.
2.4 Correctness
Claim 1. Let a value d (ever) become a committed decision in view v in the fast track. Then the progress-
certificate for every higher view v′ > v determines d as the only safe value.
Proof Sketch. Since d becomes a committed decision in view v in the fast track, there is a fast-quorum Q of
n− t replicas that send prepare messages for d in view v, before moving to any higher view.
By way of contradiction, let P ′ be the progress-certificate whose view-number v′ > v is the lowest, such
that d is not the only safe value for P ′. We are going to draw certain conclusions about PFAST and PSLOW
for P ′ in order to arrive at a contradiction.
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PFAST for P ′. First, let us compute PFAST for P ′.
Denote by Q′ the progress-quorum of n− f replicas whose new-view messages are included in P ′. Q and
Q′ intersect in a set of at least f + t + 1 correct replicas. These replicas report the prepare messages they
sent in a view v or higher (up to v′ − 1). By assumption, these prepares all contain the value d. Hence,
fast-certificate(d) is at least v in P ′.
By assumption, no value d′ 6= d is safe to propose in a view higher than v and less than v′. Hence,
the number of replicas with prepare messages in P ′ for any value d′ 6= d with view v or higher is at most
f + t. Specifically, in view v, there may be at most t correct replicas outside Q that have prepares for d′.
Additionally, there may be f Byzantine replicas with prepares for d′ with arbitrary view numbers. In total,
there are not enough prepares for fast-certificate(d′) to be v or higher.
We conclude that PFAST(d) is true, and for every other d′, PFAST(d′) is false.
PSLOW for P ′. We now compute PSLOW for P ′. Once again, we already showed that the number of
replicas with prepare messages for any value d′ 6= d whose view is v or higher is at most f + t. In total, there
are not enough prepares for a commit-certificate on d′ to have view v or higher.
Therefore, either PSLOW(d′) is false, or its commit-certificate has view-number lower than v.
Putting the constraints on PFAST and PSLOW for P ′ together, we conclude that d is the only safe value
for P ′, and we arrive at a contradiction.
Claim 2. Let a value d (ever) become a committed decision in view v in the recovery track. Then the
progress-certificate for every higher view v′ > v determines d as the safe value.
Proof Sketch. Since d becomes a committed decision in view v in the slow track, there is a recovery-quorum
Q of n− f − t replicas that send commit messages for d in view v, before moving to any higher view.
By way of contradiction, let P ′ be the progress-certificate whose view-number v′ > v is the lowest, such
that d is not the (only) safe value for P ′. We are going to draw certain conclusions about PFAST and
PSLOW for P ′ in order to arrive at a contradiction.
PFAST for P ′. First, let us compute PFAST for P ′.
Denote by Q′ the progress-quorum of n− f replicas whose new-view messages are included in P ′.
By assumption, no value d′ 6= d is safe to propose in a view higher than v and less than v′. However,
there may be f Byzantine replicas in Q′ with prepares for d′ with arbitrary view numbers. There may
be additionally up to f + t correct replicas outside Q that have prepares for d′ in view v. Therefore,
fast-certificate(d′), if non-negative, can be at most v. We conclude that either PFAST(d′) is false, or fast-
certificate(d′) has view number at most v, or both.
PSLOW for P ′. We now compute PSLOW for P ′. We already showed that the number of replicas with
prepare messages in view v or higher for any value d′ 6= d is at most 2f + t. In total, there are not enough
prepares for a commit-certificate on d′ to have a view number v or higher.
On the other hand, Q and Q′ intersect in a set of at least t + 1 correct replicas. These replicas report
the commit message they sent in view v or higher (up to v′ − 1). By assumption, these commits all contain
the value d. Hence, PSLOW(d) holds, and for no other d′ is PSLOW(d′) true.
Putting the constraints on PFAST and PSLOW for P ′ together, we conclude that d is the only safe value
for P ′, and we again arrive at a contradiction.
Claim 3. Every progress certificate determine some safe value.
Proof Sketch. Since the rules for determining the safe value for a certificate are all positive, i.e., no values
are explicitly ruled out by a certificate, there is always a possible safe value for every progress certificate.
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3 Velma: Revisiting the Zyzzyva View-Change
3.1 A Skeletal Overview of Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8] is a full State-Machine-Replication (SMR) protocol that has two commit paths. A two-phase
path that resembles PBFT and a fast path.
The fast path does not have commit messages, and replicas speculatively execute requests and optimisti-
cally return prepare results directly to clients. A client learns a commit decision in the fast path by seeing
3f + 1 prepare messages. The optimistic mode is coupled with a recovery mode that guarantees progress in
face of failures. The recovery mode intertwines a two-phase (2f +1)-quorum exchange into the protocol. In
the two-phase recovery mode, replicas proceed to speculatively execute commands as well. In both modes,
replicas may need to roll back speculative executions if in the end they conflict with committed decisions.
In Zyzzyva, a possible decision value is transferred across views in two possible ways, corresponding to the
two decision tracks of the protocol (fast and two-phase): In the fast track, a possible decision value manifests
itself as f+1 prepare messages. In the two-phase track, it manifests itself as a commit-certificate. Combining
the two, Zyzzyva prefers a commit-certificate over f + 1 prepares; and among two commit-certificates, it
prefers the one with the longer request-log.
We proceed with a skeletal description of the Zyzzyva sub-protocols, a fast-track sub-protocol, a two-
phase sub-protocol, and a view-change sub-protocol. Our description omits details regarding checkpoint
management, and many other optimizations, which are not crucial for correctness considerations, and are
described in the original papers.
Messages. All messages in the protocol are signed and may be forwarded carrying the original sender’s
signature. The protocol makes use of the following interactions.
Client-request: A client-request (REQUEST) from a client to the leader contains some operation o, whose
semantics are completely opaque for the purpose of this discussion.
Ordering-request: A leader’s pre-prepare message is called an ordering-request (ORDER-REQ), and contains
a leader’s log of client requests ORn = (o1, ..., on). (In practice, the leader sends only the last request
and a hash of the history of prior operations; a node can request the leader to re-send any missing
operations.)
Ordering-response: When a replica accepts a valid pre-prepare request, it speculatively executes it and
sends the result in a prepare message called an ordering-response (SPEC-RESPONSE).
Commit-request: A commit-request (COMMIT) from the client to the replicas includes a commit-certificate
CC, a set of 2f + 1 signed replica responses (SPEC-RESPONSE) to an (identical) ordering-request
ORn.
Commit-response: When a replica obtains a valid commit-certificate CC for ORn, it responds to client
requests in ORn with a commit message called a commit-response (LOCAL-COMMIT).
View-change: A view-change (VIEW-CHANGE) message from a replica to the leader of a new view captures
the replica’s local state.
New-view: A new-view (NEW-VIEW) message from the leader of a new view contains a set P of view-
change messages the leader collected, which serves as a leader-proof. It includes an ordering-request
for a leader-log Gn = (o1, ..., on).
The fast-track sub-protocol. Zyzzyva contains a fast-track protocol in which a client learns the result
of a request in only three message latencies, and only a linear number of crypto operations. It works as
follows.
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A client sends a request o to the current leader. The current leader extends its local log with the request
o to ORn, and sends a pre-prepare (ordering-request) carrying ORn. We did not say how a leader’s local
log is initialized. Below we discuss the protocol for a leader to pick an initial log when starting a new view.
A replica accepts a pre-prepare from the leader of the current view if it has valid format, and it extends
any previous pre-prepare from this leader. Upon accepting a pre-prepare, a replica extends its local log to
ORn It speculatively executes it, and sends the result directly to the client in a prepare message.
A decision is reached on ORn in view v in the fast track when 3f +1 distinct replicas have sent a prepare
message for it.
The two-phase sub-protocol. If progress is stalled, then a client waits to collect a commit-certificate,
a set of 2f + 1 prepare responses for ORn. Then the client sends a commit-request carrying the commit-
certificate to the replicas. A replica responds to a valid commit-request with a commit message.
A decision is reached on ORn in view v in the two-phase track when 2f + 1 distinct replica have sent a
commit message for it.
The view-change protocol. The core mechanism in Zyzzyva for transferring safe values across views
is for a new Zyzzyva leader to collect a set P of view-change messages from a quorum of 2f + 1 replicas.
Each replica sends a view-change message containing the replica’s local state: Its local request-log, and the
commit-certificate with the highest view number it responded to with a commit message, if any.
The leader processes the set P as follows.
1. Initially, it sets a leader-log G to an empty log.
2. If any view-change message contains a valid commit-certificate, then it selects the one with the longest
request-log ORn and copies ORn to G.
3. If f + 1 view-change messages contain the same request-log OR′
m
, then it extends the tail of G with
requests from OR′
m
. (If there are two OR′
m
logs satisfying this, one is selected arbitrarily.)
4. Finally, it pads G with null request entries up to the length of the longest log of any valid prepare.
The leader sends a new-view message to all the replica. The message includes the new view number v+1,
the set P of view-change messages the leader collected as a leader-proof for view (v + 1), and the leader-log
G. A replica accepts a new-view message if it is valid, and adopts the leader log. It may need to roll back
speculatively executed requests, and process new ones.
3.2 Velma
We now outline a new view-change scheme within the above Zyzzyva protocol framework. We will refer to
the fixed protocol as Velma.
In order to fix Zyzzyva, we change the method for the leader and for replicas to select safe leader-logs
during a view-change. Let P be a set of view-change messages from a view-change quorum of 2f+1 replicas.
In order to simplify processing P , we introduce several key notions. These are similar, but not identical
to those introduced in Thelma, because in Velma we need to determine safety of request-logs, rather than
of a single value.
extends: An extends relation between two request-logs O1, O2, denoted O1 ⊑ O2, indicates that O1 is a
prefix (not necessarily strict) of O2. If O1 6⊑ O2 and O2 6⊑ O1 then they are conflicting.
fast-certificate(O): The highest view-number v such that f + 1 prepare messages in P contain a log that
extends O and a view-number at least v.
To explain this notion, recall that a fast-track decision on a logO in some view v intersects a view-change
quorum in f + 1 correct replicas. However, since a committed decision may be repeatedly proposed,
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and possibly extended, in higher views, each of these f + 1 replicas sends a new-view message with a
prepare containing a log that may extend O, and may have a view-number v or higher.
If no such view-number exists, we set fast-certificate(O) to −1.
slow-certificate(O): The highest view-number v for which a commit-certificate exists for O.
If no such view-number exists, we set slow-certificate(O) to −1.
PFAST(O): If fast-certificate(O) has the highest view-number among fast-certificates in P , and there is no
O′ extending O (i.e. O ❁ O′) with the same fast-certificate, then PFAST(O) is true; otherwise, it is
false.
PSLOW(O): If slow-certificate(O) has the highest view-number among slow-certificates, and there is no
O′ extending O (i.e. O ❁ O′) with the same slow-certificate, then PSLOW(O) is true; otherwise it is
false.
We are now ready to determine when a log O is safe for a progress-certificate P :
1. PSLOW(O) holds, and for all O′, fast-certificate(O′) is lower than slow-certificate(O), or
2. PFAST(O) holds, and for all O′, slow-certificate(O′) is lower than fast-certificate(O), or
3. PSLOW(O) holds, and for every O′ whose fast-certificate(O′) has the same view-number as slow-
certificate(O), we have O′ ⊑ O, or
4. PFAST(O) holds, and for every O′ whose fast-certificate(O′) has the same view-number as slow-
certificate(O), we have O′ ⊑ O, or
5. for no value d′ does PSLOW(d) or PFAST(d) hold; hence, all values are safe.
3.3 Examples
To demonstrate Velma’s view-change, we revisit the two safety-violation scenarios in [1].
Our first scenario requires four replicas i1, i2, i3, i4, of which one, i1, is Byzantine. It proceeds in 3 views,
and arrives at a conflicting decision on the first log position.
View 1: Creating a commit-certificate for (a).
1. Leader i1 sends pre-prepare with log (a) to replicas i2 and i3.
2. Leader i1 (Byzantine) equivocates and sends pre-prepare with log (b) to replica i4.
3. Replicas i2, i3 speculatively execute a, obtain a speculative result and send it in a prepare message to
a client.
4. The client collects a commit-certificate cert of view-1 prepares from i1, i2, i3 for the log (a) and sends
it to i1.
View 2: Deciding (b).
1. The new leader i2 collects view-change messages from a quorum of 3 (including itself) as follow:
• Replica i2 sends its view-1 prepare for log (a).
• Replica i4 sends its view-1 prepare for log (b):
• Replica i1 (which is Byzantine) joins i4 and sends a view-1 prepare for log (b).
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Based on these view-change messages, PFAST is (1, (b)) and PSLOW is (−1,⊥). Hence, (b) is the only
safe choice.
i2 sends a new-view message consisting of the log (b), using the set of view-change messages as proof
that this is a safe value.
2. Every replica zeros its log (undoing a, if needed), speculatively execute b, and sends a view-2 prepare
for log (b).
3. A client collects speculative-responses from all replicas, and b becomes successfully committed at log
position 1.
View 3: Choosing the right commit-certificate.
1. The new leader i3 collects view-change messages from a quorum of s as follow:
• Replica i1, which is Byzantine, hides the value it prepared in view 2, and sends a view-1 commit-
certificate cert (see above) for (a).
• Replicas i3 and i4 send their view-2 prepares for log (b).
Based on these view-change messages, PFAST is (2, (b)), PSLOW is (1, (a)), and (b) is the only safe
choice.
The second scenario is also rather short, uses four replicas, and two view changes.
View 1: Creating a commit-certificate for (a1, a2).
1. Leader i1 sends pre-prepare with log (a1, a2) to replicas i2 and i3.
2. Leader i1 (Byzantine) equivocates and sends pre-prepare with log (b1, b2) to replica i4.
3. Replicas i2, i3 speculatively execute a1 followed by a2, obtain a speculative result and send it in a
prepare message to a client.
4. The client collects a commit-certificate cert1 of view-1 prepares from i1, i2, i3 for the log (a1, a2) and
sends it to i3.
View 2: Deciding (b1).
1. The new leader i2 collects view-change messages from a quorum of 3 (including itself) as follow:
• Replica i2 sends its view-1 prepare for log (a1, a2).
• Replica i4 sends its view-1 prepare for log (b1, b2).
• Replica i1 (which is Byzantine) joins i4 and sends a view-1 prepapre for log (b1, b2).
Based on these view-change messages, PFAST is (1, (b1, b2))i, and PSLOW is (−1,⊥). Hence, (b1, b2)
is the only safe choice.
i2 sends a new-view message consisting of the log (b1, b2), using the set of view-change messages as
proof that this is a safe value.
2. Every replica zeros its log (undoing a1,a2, if needed). It first proceeds to speculatively execute b1, and
sends a view-2 prepare for log (b1).
3. A client collects a commit-certificate cert2 of view-1 prepares from i1, i2,i4 and send it to replicas i1,
i2, and i4. They respond with a commit message for log (b1).
4. The client collects commit messages and b1 becomes successfully committed at log position 1.
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View 3: Choosing the right commit-certificate.
1. The new leader i3 collects view-change messages from a quorum of s as follow:
• Replica i3 sends commit-certificate cert1 (see above) for (a1, a2).
• Replica i4 sends commit-certificate cert2 (see above) for (b1), and its local log (b1, b2).
• Replica i1 (Byzantine) can join either one, or even send an view-change message with an empty
log.
Based on these view-change messages, PFAST is (2, (b1)), and PSLOW has view-number at most 2.
Therefore, (b1) is the only safe choice for log position 1.
3.4 Correctness
The correctness argument for Velma are similar in essence to Thelma. However, care must be taken to
preserve consistency across a sequence of consensus decisions, rather than one. And each decision must wait
for execution results of a log of requests, rather than commit to an individual proposal value.
Claim 4. Let a request-log ORn (ever) become a committed decision in view v in the fast track. If a
leader-proof of a higher view v′ > v determines OR as a safe leader-log, then ORn ⊑ OR.
Proof Sketch. Since ORn becomes a committed decision in view v in the fast track, there is a fast-quorum
Q of n replicas that send prepare messages for ORn in view v, before moving to any higher view.
By way of contradiction, let P ′ be the leader-proof whose view-number v′ > v is the lowest, and OR′
a safe leader-log of P ′ conflicting with ORn. We are going to draw certain conclusions about PFAST and
PSLOW for P ′ in order to arrive at a contradiction.
PFAST for P ′. First, let us compute PFAST for P ′.
Denote by Q′ the view-change quorum of 2f +1 replicas whose new-view messages are included in P ′. Q
and Q′ intersect in a set of at least f + 1 correct replicas. These replicas report the prepare messages they
sent in a view v or higher (up to v′ − 1). By assumption, these prepares do not conflict with ORn. Hence,
fast-certificate(ORn) is at least v in P
′.
By assumption, OR′ is not safe to propose in a view higher than v and less than v′. Hence, the number
of replicas with prepare messages in P ′ for OR′ is at most f .
In total, there are not enough prepares for fast-certificate(OR′) to be v or higher. We conclude that
PFAST(OR′) is false for every OR′ conflicting with ORn, and PFAST(OR
′
n
) is true for some some OR′
n
extending ORn.
PSLOW for P ′. We now compute PSLOW for P ′. We already showed that the number of prepares for OR′
with view-number v or higher is at most f . Therefore, there are not enough prepares for a commit-certificate
on OR′ to have view v or higher.
Therefore, either PSLOW(OR′) is false, or its commit-certificate has view-number lower than v.
Putting the constraints on PFAST and PSLOW for P ′ together, we conclude that every safe leader-log for
P ′ extends ORn, and we arrive at a contradiction.
Claim 5. Let a request-log ORn (ever) become a committed decision in view v in the two-phase track. If a
leader-proof of a higher view v′ > v determines OR as a safe leader-log, then ORn ⊑ OR.
Proof Sketch. Since ORn becomes a committed decision in view v in the slow track, there is a two-phase
quorum Q of 2f + 1 replicas that send commit messages for ORn in view v, before moving to any higher
view.
By way of contradiction, let P ′ be the leader-proof whose view-number v′ > v is the lowest, and OR′
a safe leader-log of P ′ conflicting with ORn. We are going to draw certain conclusions about PFAST and
PSLOW for P ′ in order to arrive at a contradiction.
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PFAST for P ′. First, let us compute PFAST for P ′.
Denote by Q′ the view-change quorum of 2f+1 replicas whose new-view messages are included in P ′. By
assumption, the only prepare messages in P ′ whose view is higher than v and have OR′ are faulty. Hence,
there are at most f of them. In view v, there may be additionally up to f correct replicas outside Q that
have prepares for OR′. Therefore in total, fast-certificate(OR′) in P ′ is at most v. We conclude that either
PFAST(OR′) is false, or fast-certificate(OR′) has view-number at most v, or both.
PSLOW for P ′. We now compute PSLOW for P ′.
We already showed that the number of prepare messages in P ′ whose view is v or higher and have OR′ is
at most 2f . In total, there are not enough prepares for a commit-certificate on OR′ to have a view number
v or higher.
On the other hand, Q and Q′ intersect in at least one correct replica. This replica reports the commit
message it sent in view v or higher (up to v′ − 1). By assumption, these commits all extend the value ORn.
Hence, PSLOW(OR′) is false, and PSLOW(OR′
n
) is true for some OR′
n
extending ORn.
Putting the constraints on PFAST and PSLOW for P ′ together, we conclude that every safe leader-log for
P ′ extends ORn, and we again arrive at a contradiction.
Claim 6. Every leader-proof determines some safe value.
Proof Sketch. Since the rules for determining the safe value for a proof are all positive, i.e., no values are
explicitly ruled out by it, there is always a possible safe leader-log for every leader-proof.
13
4 Zelma: Putting Fab and Zyzzyva View-Change Together
Having fixed the view-change in Zyzzyva allows us to combine the mechanism for optimistic (fast track)
execution with the parameterized n = 3f + 2t + 1 failure model of FaB. We name the combined solution
Zelma.
In Zelma, a fast-quorum consists of n− t replicas. The fast track allows a leader to extend the current log
with a new client request. The client can commit a decision by seeing n− t prepare messages. The optimistic
mode is guaranteed to complete in periods of synchrony with a correct leader and up to t Byzantine replicas.
A two-phase quorum consists of n− f − t replicas. It is essentially PBFT adapted to the parameterized
fault model. More specifically, a client collects a commit-certificate consisting of signed prepares from a
quorum of n− f − t replicas. It forwards the certificate to the replicas. A decision is reached when a quorum
of n− f − t replicas received the commit-certificate.
The two-phase track is guaranteed to complete is periods of synchrony with a correct leader, up to f
Byzantine replicas and additionally up to t slow replicas.
Zelma maintains safety at all times against up to f Byzantine failures.
If progress is stalled, Zelma provides eventual progress via a view-change protocol. A view-change quorum
consists of n− f replicas.
In Zelma, a possible decision value is transferred across views in two possible ways, corresponding to the
two decision tracks of the protocol (fast and two-phase):
In the fast track, a possible decision value manifests itself as f + t+1 prepare messages. These prepares
may potentially have different view numbers and request-logs, but they all contain the committed decision
as prefix. A fast-certificate records the (f + t+1)-highest view-number among all the prepares for the same
request-log prefix.
In the two-phase track, a decision manifests itself as a commit-certificate with 2f+t+1 identical prepares.
Combining the two, Zelma picks the highest view with either a commit-certificate or a fast-certificate.
This becomes the initial leader-log for a new-view. If the highest commit-certificate and fast-certificate have
equal view-numbers, then the initial leader-log is a concatenation of the commit-certificate log, with any
remaining entries from the fast-certificate log.
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